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Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory
Immigration Detention
Geoffrey Heeren*
INTRODUCTION
During the three years that Mohammad Azam Hussain was in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), he lost three teeth.
The dentist who pulled those teeth suggested that Hussain would keep losing
teeth until he received periodontal surgery. Hussain had developed gum disease while in DHS custody—a condition he blamed on poor nutrition and a
lack of real toothbrushes in one of the jails at which he was housed. But the
Division of Immigrant Health Services would not pay for surgery to address
the underlying gum disease—it would only pay for extraction.
DHS may have preferred a stopgap measure like pulling teeth to dental
surgery because it considers immigration detention to be short-term—a form
of preventative, not punitive, custody designed to assure the appearance of
immigrants who might otherwise fail to show up for their supposedly fasttrack removal proceedings. In fact, an increasing number of immigrants are
subject to “mandatory detention,” meaning that they are ineligible for bond
because they are subject to removal on certain grounds.1 This practice is in
tension with case law that generally requires special procedural safeguards
for civil detention.2 However, when the Supreme Court last considered the
constitutionality of mandatory immigration detention, the government assured the Court that it processed the vast majority of removal cases in one
and a half months, and the minority of cases in which the immigrant appeals
in five months.3 The Court upheld mandatory detention, in large part based
on this premise.4

* Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago. I would like to
thank Lisa Palumbo, Judy Rabinovitz, and the staff of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties
Law Review for their invaluable assistance. This article is dedicated to Mohammad Azam
Hussain.
1
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006) (requiring certain categories of immigrants to be detained
during removal proceedings). Sixty-six percent of current detainees are considered subject to
mandatory detention. DORA SCHRIRO, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION, OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6
(Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/091005_ice_detention_report-final.pdf.
2
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
84 (1992).
3
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 530 (2003).
4
Id. at 531.
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It might be expected that in an immigration detention system as large as
that of the United States5 a tooth will be pulled here or there, even if detention is short-term; but Hussain’s three pulled teeth belie the notion that immigration detention is always quick. While it is true that the majority of
detainees are removed quickly, a significant minority—about 2100 per
year—languish in detention for a year or more while they pursue legal challenges.6 Hussain was in detention for nearly three years.7 Some might argue
that this is an appropriate result in cases against individuals with tenuous
claims, who are likely to be deported. Hussain’s claims were not tenuous,
however. In fact, he ultimately won relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”).8 Moreover, Hussain’s case is not anomalous—over the
past eight years, thousands of immigrants who eventually won their cases
spent long periods of time in immigration custody.9
There are fundamental problems with holding individuals in long-term
custody under conditions designed for the short term. While Hussain was
losing approximately a tooth per year, other immigrants were dying while in
detention. From 2003 to the present, at least 107 detainees have died in

5

In 2007, DHS detained approximately 311,000 individuals. DHS ANNUAL REPORT, IMENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2007 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_07.pdf. DHS detains more than 30,000 immigrants each day. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ALIEN DETENTION STANDARDS: OBSERVATIONS ON THE ADHERENCE TO ICE’S MEDICAL STANDARDS IN DETENTION FACILITIES 1
(2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08869t.pdf.
6
According to the Schriro Report, “On average, an alien is detained thirty days. The
length of detention however, varies appreciably between those pursuing voluntary removals
and those seeking relief. As much as 25% of the detained population is released within one
day of admission, 38% within a week, 71% in less than a month, and 95% within four months.
Less than 1% of all admissions, about 2,100 aliens, are detained for a year or more.” SCHRIRO,
supra note 1, at 6. Another recent report by the Migration Policy Institute (“MPI”) provides a
different picture. The MPI report analyzed data concerning 18,690 persons in immigration
detention pursuant to removal proceedings on a single day in January 2009. According to its
analysis, the average length of detention was eighty-one days; 74% of the detainees had been
detained for less than ninety days; 13% for between ninety days and six months; 10% for
between six months and one year; and 3% for more than one year. DONALD KERWIN &
SERENA YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRANT DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS
LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 16 (2009), http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf. The chief discrepancy between
the Schriro data and the MPI findings probably relates to MPI’s focus on immigrants in removal proceedings. Schriro’s data, in contrast, appears to have encompassed individuals who
were not entitled to removal proceedings or who voluntarily stipulated to their removal.
7
See Mark Brown, Immigrant Still in Jail, Even though Judge Let Him Go Free, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at 2.
8
See Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008).
9
According to data obtained by the ACLU from DHS throughout a Freedom of Information Act request, from November 14, 2001 to September 30, 2009, DHS terminated charges
against or awarded waivers of deportation to 5829 persons who were held in detention for six
months or more (note that this number does not include individuals who, like Hussain, won
CAT relief). Of these individuals, 1424 were held for more than one year, six persons were
held for more than five years, and one person was held for nearly eight years. See American
Civil Liberties Union Freedom of Information Act request data (on file with author) [hereinafter ACLU FOIA Data].
MIGRATION
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immigration custody.10 The current administration has responded to multiple
media exposés regarding detention conditions by promising to reform the
system.11 The Government’s proposed reforms focus on improving both the
physical space of detention and the quality of medical care.12 While these
proposed reforms are a step in the right direction, there is reason to be skeptical that a system designed to serve short-term detainees can ever provide
adequate health care for individuals like Hussain, who spend years in custody. Hussain’s case suggests that as long as the majority of immigrants are
detained for short periods of time, the government’s managed care apparatus
will favor short-term medical solutions, like pulling teeth.
Some lawyers who represent long-term detainees have responded to
this problem by bringing legal challenges. Although the Supreme Court initially upheld mandatory detention, a growing number of lower courts have
become convinced that prolonged mandatory detention raises a set of troubling constitutional issues that the Supreme Court did not have occasion to
address.13 Several circuits have carved out their own exceptions to
mandatory detention, which allow certain detainees to seek release through
habeas corpus proceedings or an immigration judge (“IJ”) bond hearing.14
Unfortunately, litigation is unlikely to be a viable solution for most
immigrants in prolonged detention. After six years of litigation, only three
circuits have issued precedential decisions acknowledging some right to
challenge mandatory detention during removal proceedings, and these decisions offer inconsistent solutions to the problem.15 The reason for the lack of
guidance from courts is clear: it is logistically difficult to bring a habeas
petition. Federal litigation is complex, resource-intensive, and time-consuming. Moreover, the legal framework for mandatory detention is a fluid network of statutes, and courts are apt to deem cases moot when the legal
authority for detention shifts from one statute to another.16 While class actions sometimes provide a means for creating a uniform rule of law where
the issues are difficult to litigate in an individual case, efforts to certify a
10
Susan Caroll, Immigrant Facilities Subpar: Chronicle Review Shows ICE Not Enforcing
Its Own Standards of Care, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 5, 2010.
11
For an account of the government’s initial efforts to keep news of detainee deaths quiet,
see Nina Bernstein, Officials Hid Truth of Immigrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010,
at A1. For information concerning DHS’s reform plans, see Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland
Security, Secretary Napolitano and ICE Assistant Secretary Morton Announce New Immigration Detention Reform Initiatives (Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1254839781410.shtm [hereinafter DHS Press Release].
12
DHS Press Release, supra note 11.
13
See, e.g., Alli v. Decker, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that there is
a “growing consensus within this district and, indeed it appears throughout the federal courts,
that prolonged detention of aliens under § 1226(c) raises serious constitutional concerns.”).
14
See Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2008);
Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 2007); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 269–70
(6th Cir. 2003).
15
Id.
16
See Hussain, 510 F.3d at 742 (finding the appeal moot after the issuance of a final
administrative removal order).

R
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class of mandatory detainees have so far had mixed results.17 Even if the
Supreme Court were to enter the fray, there is reason to doubt that it can
adequately resolve this issue, given the tangled history of immigration detention litigation.18
In this article I contend that the current framework for mandatory detention is unfair and inefficient. Persons are deemed subject to mandatory
detention based on a complicated categorical analysis that does not consider
the individual facts of a case. This approach, which prioritizes abstract legal
categories over case-specific facts, does a poor job of assessing whether a
person is actually a flight or security risk. Requiring the detained immigrant
to prove that the government is substantially unlikely to win its case in order
to defeat mandatory detention exacerbates the problem of unfairness.19 The
burden of proof in the proceeding is placed on the party with the least resources—the detainee—who is usually unrepresented and lacking the legal
education necessary to comprehend the esoteric nuances of immigration
law.20 Detainees often have difficulty making a phone call, let alone conducting legal research or gathering evidence.21 To make matters worse, detainees may receive videoconference hearings, which are plagued by
technical defects and problems related to interpretation, credibility assessment, presentation of evidence, and access to counsel.22
If Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is to adequately reform immigration detention, it must do more than improve the physical infrastructure of detention facilities; it must also make changes to its legal
process that governs detention so that detainees are not held for years without possibility of bond. A host of recent studies document the problems
with detention conditions and make recommendations regarding how to im-

17
Compare Alli, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter
class-wide relief), with Rodriguez v. Hayes, 578 F.3d 1032, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing the
District Court’s denial of class certification).
18
See infra Part II.A.
19
See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring).
20
From 2004 to 2008, between 35% and 45% of immigrants have been represented by
counsel in removal proceedings. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 (2009), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/
fy08syb.pdf. The number of detainees represented in removal proceedings is much smaller; a
recent study shows that in 2007, 84% of detainees represented themselves pro se. NINA SIULC
ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND PROMOTING JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM 1 (2008), available at
http://www.vera.org/download?file=1780/LOP%2BEvaluation. For a discussion of the crisis
in representation of immigrant detainees, see Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation
for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, a Case Study,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 541–46 (2009).
21
See JACOB CHIN ET AL., ATTORNEYS’ PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS OF DETAINED IMMIGRANTS IN MINNESOTA (2009), available at http://www.mcaa-mn.org/docs/2009/20091204121
228744.pdf.
22
See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1186–88
(2009).
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prove such conditions.23 For the most part, this article will not address these
recommendations because I contend that reforms geared towards improving
conditions for a population of predominately short-term detainees will be
inadequate to address the needs of the small, but significant population of
long-term detainees. The best solution to the problems raised by prolonged
detention is to reform the legal structure.
There are various routes by which legal reform may be accomplished.
Ideally, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) should be amended to
return discretion to immigration judges (“IJs”) to grant bond to persons
whom they deem to be a low flight risk.24 Alternatively, ICE could accomplish various reforms by issuing new guidance or regulations. For example,
ICE might interpret the immigration statutes to authorize mandatory detention for only a limited period, as several courts have done, or to only authorize detention of persons with no colorable challenge to their removal.25 ICE
might also use electronic monitoring as an alternative solution for some immigrants who are currently held in prolonged mandatory detention.
During his three years in immigration custody, Hussain was subject to
many of the statutes and regulations governing immigration detention and
was exposed to multiple detention facilities. Therefore, I use Hussain’s story
to illustrate the process of immigration detention and its considerable
problems. In the prologue, I explain how Hussain came to be held in detention. In Part I, I describe the legal framework for detention and the conditions of custody using Hussain’s story as a case study. In Part II, I describe
the legal challenges to mandatory detention, including those made by Hussain. In Part III, I set out DHS’s proposed reforms to detention conditions
and contend that neither these changes nor detention litigation are likely to
result in a satisfactory solution to the problems raised in cases like Hussain’s.
I argue for restoration of due process for persons who would otherwise suffer for years under custody conditions designed for a maximum period of
weeks.

23
See, e.g., CHIN ET AL., supra note 21; SW. INST. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, UNIV. OF
ARIZONA, UNSEEN PRISONERS: A REPORT ON WOMEN IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES
IN ARIZONA (2009), available at http://sirow.arizona.edu/files/UnseenPrisoners.pdf; FLA. IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CTR., DYING FOR DECENT CARE: BAD MEDICINE IN IMMIGRATION CUSTODY
10–27 (2009), available at http://www.fiacfla.org/reports/DyingForDecentCare.pdf; NEW ORLEANS WORKERS’ CTR. FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, DETENTION CONDITIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: IMMIGRANT DETAINEES REPORT FROM BASILE, LOUISIANA (Jul. 2009), available at http://www.nowcrj.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/detentionconditions-report.pdf.
24
For a history of immigration bond provisions, see infra Part I.A.
25
See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 947–48 (9th Cir.
2008) (construing the mandatory detention statute to authorize detention only for a reasonable
period); Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the court has
left open the question of “whether mandatory detention under § 1226(c) is consistent with due
process when a detainee makes a colorable claim that he is not in fact deportable”); Ly v.
Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 269–70 (6th Cir. 2003).

R

\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC209.txt

606

unknown

Seq: 6

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
PROLOGUE: FLIGHT

AND

6-AUG-10

15:10

[Vol. 45

REFUGE

Mohammad Azam Hussain was born in one of the most violent cities in
the world—Karachi, Pakistan. His parents were “Mohajirs,” or refugees,
who traveled to Pakistan from India when the two countries were carved out
of former British colonial India.26 The partition of India was a bloodbath
with an estimated death toll as high as one million.27 Like many Mohajirs,
Hussain’s family eventually settled in Karachi, in the province of Sindh.28
Today approximately six million residents of Karachi identify as Mohajirs.29
In 1985, Hussain joined a party called the “Mohajir Qaumi Movement”
(“MQM”).30 MQM was founded the year before by a group of friends who
had met in Karachi educational institutions. Dedicated to a platform of
Mohajir rights, the party expanded rapidly during the 1980s, a turbulent period of transition from military rule to the restoration of democracy in 1988.
During this period, several political parties violently competed for power on
the streets and campuses of Karachi.31
Hussain, who handed out pamphlets for MQM and organized the student “ladies’ wing,” was a victim of this political violence—his brothers
were tortured, he was beaten so badly he had to be hospitalized for his injuries, and his father’s shop was burned. At his family’s request, Hussain temporarily ceased political work and concentrated on his studies. However,
when Hussain took his final college exam, a group of Punjabi students assaulted him because of his ethnicity, so that he was unable to complete his
education. After this incident, Hussain became convinced that “MQM was
the only solution for people like me,” and returned to the party, which was
destined for a meteoric rise and a paradoxical role in Pakistani politics.32
MQM is full of contradictions. It is a progressive party with a liberal
agenda; however, it is also a group with a well-earned reputation for thuggery. MQM may be based in the same part of the world as the September
11th hijackers, but it is a far cry from Al-Qaeda; it is a decidedly secular
political organization and one of the most potent foes of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan today. MQM cannot be easily pigeonholed—to understand the party and its thousands of members, one must first understand the
tumultuous dynamics of a country unfamiliar to most Americans.
Hussain’s role in MQM was also complicated. In late 1990 there was a
schism in the party, and Hussain remained loyal to ousted members who left
Pakistan for the United States. The remaining MQM members assaulted
26
See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 073688) [hereinafter Hussain Brief].
27
See STANLEY WOLPERT, A NEW HISTORY OF INDIA 348 (1993).
28
Hussain Brief, supra note 26, at 3.
29
OSKAR VERKAAIK, MIGRANTS AND MILITANTS: FUN AND URBAN VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN
2 (2004).
30
Hussain Brief, supra note 26, at 3–4.
31
VERKAAIK, supra note 29, at 66.
32
Hussain Brief, supra note 26, at 4.

R
R
R
R
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Hussain and his family, and kidnapped Hussain and tortured him for two
days. He was only released after he agreed to sign a loyalty pledge to
MQM’s leader, Altaf Hussain.33 After being released, Hussain fled to India
for several months.
The MQM members who left for the United States eventually returned
to Pakistan and formed a new party called MQM-H (“H” for Haqiqi, meaning “original”). Hussain also returned to Pakistan and joined MQM-H,
heading a neighborhood office for approximately two years. He made
speeches, took community complaints, campaigned for MQM-H candidates
and worked to improve infrastructure and create new jobs in his
community.34
Hussain continued to fear for his safety, however. During this time,
members of the two factions engaged in violence against each other. Government security forces also attacked members of both groups. Eventually,
Hussain came to fear that he would be assassinated like many of his colleagues. Thus, in 1994 he fled to the United States using a “humanitarian
parole” document that he obtained from a government official in Pakistan.
About a week after his arrival, Hussain learned that his former office had
been attacked, and that seven of the workers, including the person who had
been sitting in his office space, had been killed.35
Hussain settled in the Chicago area. He married his wife, Patricia, on
June 10, 1996.36 Like many immigrants, Hussain pursued a variety of occupations, including chef, cab driver, and construction worker. He made many
friends in Chicago’s South Asian community, and in his spare time played
soccer, ping-pong, and came to be highly regarded as a singer at weddings
and other events. In 1997, Hussain’s wife petitioned for him to become a
lawful permanent resident.37 The application was granted on August 6, 1999,
and the following year the couple had a daughter, Alishia Hussain.38
In 2003, Hussain applied for naturalization. With his application still
pending, he received a premature recognition of his citizenship—a “Citizen
Appreciation Award” from the Des Plaines Police Department for helping
apprehend the armed robbers of a gas station. Hussain and his wife observed a robbery as they drove home one night. They quickly tracked down
a police officer and brought him back to the crime scene. According to Des
Plaines Mayor Anthony Arredia, “As a private citizen, his actions were out-

33

Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8–10.
Id. at 10–12.
36
Id. at 12.
37
As legal authority for the adjustment, Hussain relied on a provision that allowed certain
applicants who had failed to follow correct immigration procedures to adjust status anyway, if
they paid a $1000 fine. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2006).
38
Hussain Brief, supra note 26, at 15.
34
35

R
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standing. His quick thinking led to the arrest of three armed offenders and
possibly saved the life of a gas station attendant.”39
It must have seemed to Hussain that he was on the verge of achieving
the American Dream. Things took a sharp turn for the worse, however,
when Hussain returned to the United States from a trip to Pakistan in July
2004, where he was visiting his sick mother and dying sister-in-law for the
second time that year.40 After Hussain got off the plane, immigration authorities held him for lengthy questioning. Two months later, the FBI arrived at
his house and arrested him for making false statements on his citizenship
application.41 DHS had scoured Hussain’s naturalization application and
found that he had responded to a question asking if he had ever been a
member of any political or social group by checking the box indicating that
he had not. DHS knew this was untrue because Hussain had previously
disclosed on his green card application that he had been a member of
MQM.42
The Government charged Hussain with violating one federal statute relating to misrepresentation and another barring the unlawful procurement of
citizenship.43 Because of Hussain’s association with MQM, DHS sought to
have him held without bond. Hussain drew Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
for his bond hearing, a former roommate of Attorney General John Ashcroft
who spent much of his legal career as a chief immigration prosecutor and IJ
in Chicago.44 Judge Der-Yeghiayan denied bond, finding that Hussain was a
flight risk: “It appears likely that Hussain will eventually be deported regardless of whether or not he is convicted in the United States. Hussain
therefore has no incentive to remain in the United States and face prosecution and is likely to flee and seek haven in Karachi, Pakistan.”45 Judge DerYeghiayan, who is an Armenian immigrant, stated further that he found Hussain’s actions “an insult to the law abiding immigrant community.”46
The Government quickly touted the Hussain case in the media as an
example of its success in the War on Terror.47 Nonetheless, it was initially
unable to convict Hussain—Hussain’s trial ended on January 13, 2005, and

39

Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 15.
43
See 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2006) (procurement of citizenship unlawfully); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(2) (2006) (false statements).
44
Carol Marin, What Makes a Good Judicial Nominee?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at
B6.
45
United States v. Hussain, No. 04 CR 839-1, 2004 WL 2325745, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8,
2004) (mem. opinion). As a former IJ, Judge Der-Yeghiayan should have been well aware that
despite a conviction, Hussain would have still been eligible for CAT and other forms of immigration relief that would allow him to remain in the United States.
46
Id.
47
See Matt O’Connor, Pakistani Denied Bail as Founder of Terror-Group, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
8, 2004, at 4.
40
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resulted in a hung jury.48 Afterwards, the Government filed a superseding
indictment with an additional charge.49 The prosecutors had uncovered Hussain’s mortgage applications, in which a box had been checked stating that
Hussain was a United States citizen.50 On June 13, 2005, Hussain was convicted after a second trial and sentenced to nine months of incarceration,
time that he had already served in pretrial detention. Hussain appealed this
conviction, represented by the appellate advocacy clinic at the University of
Chicago Law School. DHS did not wait for Hussain’s appeal to be resolved.
On July 27, 2005, DHS took Hussain into immigration custody and began
removal proceedings against him.51
PART I: A PROFILE

OF

IMMIGRATION DETENTION

The legal framework for immigration detention is extraordinarily complicated. At least three statutes authorize the detention of immigrants: 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b) for inadmissible “arriving aliens,” 8 U.S.C. § 1226 for
immigrants in the United States who are placed in removal proceedings, and
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) for immigrants who have been ordered removed and who
are awaiting deportation.52 There are two federal agencies—DHS and the
Department of Justice—that administer the detention statutes. Two separate
sub-agencies of DHS, ICE and Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”),
make decisions about “parole” from custody for “arriving aliens.”53 ICE
makes initial custody decisions for immigrants it apprehends and places in
48

Hussain Brief, supra note 26, at 17.
Third Superseding Indictment, United States v. Hussain, No. 04 CR 839-1, 2005 WL
5704122 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2005).
50
The Government’s additional charge was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 911 (2006), which
prohibits false attestations of United States citizenship.
51
Hussain Brief, supra note 26, at 18.
52
See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 578 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 2009).
53
Immigrants who are deemed inadmissible upon arrival at a port of entry are subject to
detention and expedited removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2006). “Parole,” in this context, is a
term of art that refers both to the discretionary authority of DHS to allow an otherwise inadmissible “arriving alien” into the United States without granting her the rights that would
come with a more formal “admission,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5
(2009), as well as the discretion of DHS to not detain such an arriving alien, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(2)(B) (2006). Recently, parole has been used to informally admit various categories
of immigrants, ranging from persons who are granted “deferred inspection” to obtain necessary evidence of their admissibility, to Haitian orphans admitted after the January 2010 earthquake. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.2 (2009) (deferred inspection of certain arriving aliens); Press
Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano Announces Humanitarian Parole
Policy for Certain Haitian Orphans (Jan. 18, 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/
releases/pr_1263861907258.shtm. One significant category of immigrants who are eligible for
parole is arriving asylum seekers. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM
SEEKERS SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON 47 (2009), available at http://www.human
rightsfirst.org/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf. In recent history, very few
asylum seekers have been granted parole. Id. at 31. However, in December 2009, DHS released revised parole guidelines, which should make it much easier for asylum applicants to be
released. See ICE, REVISED PAROLE POLICY FOR ARRIVING ALIENS WITH CREDIBLE FEAR
CLAIMS (Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/credible-fear.htm.

R

49

R

\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC209.txt

610

unknown

Seq: 10

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

6-AUG-10

15:10

[Vol. 45

removal proceedings in the United States. IJs, who are part of the Executive
Office for Immigration Review of the Department of Justice, have jurisdiction to review some, but not all detention decisions made by ICE.54
A dense web of regulations and legal interpretations come into play at
different stages in the process. There is one standard for making bond determinations for immigrants in removal proceedings who are not charged with
a ground of mandatory detention and a different standard for immigrants
who are alleged to be ineligible for bond.55 A third set of rules governs the
“post-order custody review” process for immigrants who have been ordered
removed but cannot be deported.56 Each of these standards applied at some
point in Hussain’s case.
A. Bond Eligibility
Historically, immigrants involved in removal proceedings were not detained unless they were found to be a flight or security risk.57 Even then they
were eligible for release on bond.58 The first mandatory detention provision
was enacted in 1988 as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.59 The Act created a
new ground for deportation of persons convicted of an “aggravated felony,”
which it defined to include murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking.60 The Act further subjected immigrants convicted of an aggravated felony to mandatory custody without possibility of bond.61 Most courts that
considered the constitutionality of this provision held that it violated immigrants’ right to due process.62
In the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed two
laws that toughened deportation provisions and immigration detention. The
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) greatly
expanded both the definition of “aggravated felony” and the categories of
immigrants subject to mandatory detention.63 After the passage of AEDPA,
immigrants who had been convicted of multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled substances offenses, firearms offenses, and certain national security-related offenses became subject to detention during removal
proceedings without possibility of bond.64
54
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i) (2009) (barring IJs from reviewing DHS’s custody determinations with respect to various categories of detained immigrants).
55
Cf. Matter of Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1111–12 (BIA 1999) (general bond standard); Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 806 (BIA 1999) (standard for immigrants alleged
to be subject to mandatory detention).
56
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a) (2009).
57
See Matter of Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666, 666 (BIA 1976).
58
Id.
59
Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
60
Id. § 7342.
61
Id. § 7343(a)(4).
62
See, e.g., Kellman v. INS, 750 F. Supp. 625, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
63
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (1996).
64
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2006).

\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC209.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 11

6-AUG-10

Pulling Teeth

15:10

611

Soon after the passage of AEDPA, Congress passed another law that
expanded the scope of mandatory detention: the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).65 IIRIRA expanded
the increasingly bloated aggravated felony category, and thus mandatory detention, to encompass still more types of crimes.66 After the passage of
IIRIRA, Congress codified the immigration detention provision at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226.
Section 1226(a) authorizes the detention of immigrants during proceedings, but also provides for their release on either “conditional parole” or
with a bond of at least $1500.67 Section 1226(c) contains the mandatory
custody provision, which requires detention without bond for immigrants
who are “deportable” or “inadmissible” for a litany of statutory grounds,
including multiple “crimes involving moral turpitude.”68 “Moral turpitude”
is a long-standing, but fairly amorphous category of crimes that are considered by courts to be “morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong.”69
In the “Notice to Appear” for removal proceedings that ICE served on
Hussain, it charged that he was removable for having been convicted of a
“crime involving moral turpitude,” obtaining admission and other immigration benefits by fraud, and making false claims to United States citizenship.70
It was unclear whether Hussain’s crime involved moral turpitude or subjected him to mandatory detention. Nonetheless, ICE informed Hussain that
it had chosen to deny him bond, and that he could appeal the decision to an
IJ.71 Hussain appealed, and IJ George Katsivalis denied him bond as a matter of discretion.72
B. Bond Procedures in Mandatory Detention Cases
Had DHS taken the position that Hussain was subject to mandatory
detention, he would have had the burden of proving to the judge that DHS
was wrong. Instead of a bond hearing, he would have had a “Joseph” hearing, named after the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision in
Matter of Joseph,73 in which the BIA first stated the bond standard for
65

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-627 (1996). For example, IIRIRA created a
new aggravated felony category for crimes involving sexual abuse of a minor, and reduced the
sentence necessary to make a theft or crime of violence an aggravated felony from five years
to one year. Id.
67
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006).
68
Id. § 1226(c).
69
See Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004).
70
Hussain Brief, supra note 26, at 18.
71
DHS makes initial custody decisions for aliens involved in proceedings, but IJs have the
authority to review DHS’s initial determination upon an oral or written request made by the
alien. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1003.19 (2009).
72
See Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Mohammad Azam Hussain, A070-921-157
(Chi. Immigr. Ct. Feb. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Bond Memo].
73
22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).
66

R

\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC209.txt

612

unknown

Seq: 12

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

6-AUG-10

15:10

[Vol. 45

mandatory detainees. Under Matter of Joseph, an immigrant charged with a
ground of mandatory detention will only receive a bond hearing if she can
prove that DHS is substantially unlikely to prevail on its charge.74
The Matter of Joseph process eventually did come into play in Hussain’s case. Hussain disputed the charges against him and sought various
forms of relief from removal including asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).75 His “merits” hearing consisted of several proceedings that took place between December 15,
2005 and April 28, 2006, after which the IJ took his case under advisement.76
As of October 11, 2006, the IJ still had not reached a decision in Hussain’s
case. Hussain filed a new motion for release on bond, arguing that the sheer
length of his time in detention (over fourteen months) constituted a changed
circumstance meriting reconsideration of the IJ’s original order denying
bond.77
Not long afterwards, the U.S. Attorney called Hussain’s criminal attorneys to tell them something extraordinary—the Government wished to vacate Hussain’s conviction and dismiss the indictment against him.
According to the U.S. Attorney, the prosecutors realized that they possessed
relevant evidence that they had failed to disclose in Hussain’s criminal trial.
The U.S. Attorney would not say what the evidence was or admit that it
would have made a difference in the case. However, according to the motion that the U.S. Attorney later filed, the “information provides, in the context of this case, a ground for a new trial.”78
On November 9, 2006, District Court Judge James Zagel vacated Hussain’s convictions, and on December 21, 2006, after viewing the Government’s evidence, the District Court dismissed the indictment against
Hussain.79 For the next two months we pressed IJ Katsivalis for a decision
on bond.
DHS opposed Hussain’s motion, arguing that his involvement with
MQM constituted material support of a terrorist organization which made
him ineligible for bond. Historically, the BIA had held that immigrants were
only subject to mandatory detention when charged with a ground of removal
that triggered mandatory detention.80 DHS claimed, however, that a terrorism charge was unnecessary in Hussain’s case and that its mere say-so precluded the IJ from considering bond.81 DHS based this argument on
language in the regulations that deprived IJs of jurisdiction to hold bond
74

See id. at 806.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006) (asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006) (withholding of
removal); 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2009) (Convention Against Torture).
76
Hussain Brief, supra note 26, at 18–20.
77
Id. at 20.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 806 (BIA 1999).
81
Brief for Appellant on Appeal of Immigration Judge’s Redetermination of Bond, In re
Hussain, A070-921-157 (BIA Mar. 29, 2007).
75

R

\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC209.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 13

Pulling Teeth

6-AUG-10

15:10

613

hearings for various types of cases, including those involving immigrants
“described in” the terrorism grounds.82 Essentially, DHS argued that “described in” was not limited to formally alleged terrorists and could include
immigrants that DHS informally described as terrorists.
On February 20, 2007, IJ Katsivalis issued a decision finding that Hussain was eligible for bond because DHS had not charged him with a terrorism ground of removal.83 Enthused by this positive development, Hussain’s
friends mobilized to raise a $40,000 bond for his release. However, DHS
refused to accept the money when they attempted to pay the bond. DHS
appealed the IJ’s bond order to the BIA, invoking a regulation that allows
DHS to obtain an automatic stay of the bond order by filing a notice of intent
to appeal within one business day.84 Despite having finally convinced a
judge to let him out, Hussain seemed stuck in jail.
C. The Conditions of Confinement
Initially, Hussain was detained at the Kenosha County Detention Center
(“Kenosha”), which is a county jail near Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Kenosha
holds immigration detainees pursuant to an intergovernmental service agreement (“IGSA”) that it negotiated with the U.S. Marshal. DHS now detains
approximately 50% of immigration detainees in 240 county jails like Kenosha, which mix immigration detainees with criminals.85 The other 50% of
the detained population is held in twenty-one “dedicated” facilities that are
solely reserved for immigration detainees.86 Among these facilities are
seven “Service Processing Centers” owned by DHS and operated by the
private sector, seven dedicated “Contract Detention Facilities” owned and
operated by the private sector, and seven IGSA county jail facilities that only
house immigration detainees.87
This sprawling network of county and private jails has grown to become the largest prison system in the country.88 In the past four years, Congress has doubled the annual budget for ICE detention and removal
operations to $2.4 billion, with nearly 70%—or $1.7 billion—devoted to
“custody operations.”89 Private and public entities, large and small, have
benefited from budgetary increases. The GEO Group and the Corrections
Corporation of America, the nation’s two largest private prison companies,

82

8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(C) (2009).
Bond Memo, supra note 72, at 2.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.6(c), 1003.19(i) (2009).
85
SCHRIRO, supra note 1, at 10.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 6.
89
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 53, at 47.
83
84
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have reported a sunny outlook in their earnings reports.90 Among the
smaller players who have profited from this growing funding stream is a
native Alaskan tribe, which owns a controlling share in the Varick Street
Detention Center in Greenwich Village.91
It stands to reason that private companies and cash-strapped counties
might cut corners to maximize their profits from immigration detention. A
number of recent news reports have shown this to be the case. Detainees
housed at the Varick Street facility, for example, repeatedly complained of
“frigid temperatures, mildew and meals that leave detainees hungry and
willing to clean for $1 a day to pay for commissary food.”92 Since 2003, at
least 107 individuals have died in immigration detention, and in many of
these cases, poor medical care seems to have been a contributing factor.93
Mentally ill persons fare particularly poorly in detention—either going untreated or receiving “one size fits all” medication, and sometimes being
placed in solitary confinement.94 The standards that govern ICE detention
were derived from criminal standards,95 but many facilities fail to follow
even these rudimentary standards concerning recreation and access to counsel, legal materials, and telephones.96
Initially, most detainees are held in custody close to where they were
first detained. However, ICE often transfers detainees to remote detention
centers, far from detainees’ family members and attorneys. From 1999 to
2008, 1.4 million detainee transfers occurred.97 These transfers make it difficult for detainees to secure legal representation or work effectively with their

90
Renee Feltz, Focus on “Criminal Aliens” Increases Demand for Immigrant Detention
Business, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/renee-feltz/focuson-criminal-aliens_b_347303.html.
91
Nina Bernstein, Immigrant Jail Tests U.S. View of Legal Access, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2009, at A1. On January 14, 2010, ICE announced that it intends to suspend use of the Varick
Street facility. Press Release, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE to Suspend the Use
of Varick Facility to House Detainees (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/
1001/100114newyork1.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
92
Id.
93
See Nina Bernstein, Hurdles Shown in Detention Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2009, at
A21; Nina Bernstein, Piecing Together an Immigrant’s Life the U.S. Refused to See, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 6, 2009, at A1; Amy Goldstein & Dana Priest, In Custody, In Pain: Beset by
Medical Problems as She Fights Deportation, A U.S. Resident Struggles to Get the Treatment
She Needs, WASH. POST, May 12, 2008, at A1; Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, System of
Neglect: As Tighter Immigration Policies Strain Federal Agencies, the Detainees in Their Care
Often Pay a Heavy Cost, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at A1.
94
Nina Bernstein, Mentally Ill and in Immigration Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2009, at
A17; Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, Suicides Point to Gaps in Treatment: Errors in Psychiatric Diagnoses and Drugs Plague Strained Immigration System, WASH. POST, May 13, 2008, at
A1.
95
SCHRIRO, supra note 1, at 16.
96
Anna Gorman, Immigration Detention Centers Failed to Meet Standards, Report Says,
L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2009, at A14.
97
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO
REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.
org/sites/default/files/reports/us1209web.pdf.
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attorneys.98 They also exact a personal toll on detainees and their family
members, who may have difficulty visiting them in faraway detention centers. Hussain was transferred so many times that he eventually completed a
circuit of every single detention center that was then under the jurisdiction of
the Chicago ICE office. He therefore had an opportunity to observe and
compare a wide range of facilities.
Relative to other facilities, the Kenosha County Jail where Hussain was
first held had some positive aspects. At Kenosha, Hussain and the other
detainees were allowed outside for recreation for about one to two hours
daily. He was also able to visit with his wife and daughter once per week for
about thirty minutes, although they were separated by a clear partition.
In time, however, Hussain began to experience problems at Kenosha,
especially related to his religion. Unlike Christian detainees, the Islamic detainees at Kenosha were not allowed to gather together for a group “congregational prayer.” When the holy month of Ramadan commenced in
October, Hussain was not easily able to fast. Islam mandates that adherents
fast from sunrise to sunset during Ramadan. Thus, a Muslim person will eat
three meals during Ramadan, but the meals should be before sun-up, immediately after sunset, and at approximately eleven o’clock at night. The Kenosha staff served all three meals to Hussain cold, sometimes late, and
oftentimes frozen. Moreover, the meals frequently contained non-Halal
meat and the staff did not allow him to brush his teeth after eating, which
was technically a violation of his fast. Finally, the Kenosha guards forbade
Hussain from praying late (midnight or so).99
The guards also came up with a series of derogatory nicknames for
Hussain. They called him “Saddam Hussein,” “Al Qaeda,” or “Osama bin
Laden.” They might say, “Hey, Al Qaeda, your mail is here. Come get
your mail, Al Qaeda.” Perhaps the guards were joking, but on one occasion,
when Hussain was taken from Kenosha to Chicago for an immigration hearing, one of the ICE guards asked him, with utter seriousness, where Osama
bin Laden was hiding.
In late 2005, ICE moved Hussain about an hour outside Chicago to the
McHenry County Jail. He did not find it much easier to practice Islam at
McHenry. Although Muslim detainees were allowed congregational prayer,
they could not visit imams for religious counseling. While at McHenry,
Hussain repeatedly requested that he be placed on the Kosher diet, which he
considered to be an acceptable alternative to Halal under the circumstances.
McHenry insisted, however, that it would only provide the Kosher diet to

98

Id.
E-mail from Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Fund of Metropolitan
Chicago, to Glenn Triveline, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Oct. 28, 2005 10:09
CST) (on file with author).
99
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Jewish detainees. Thus, Hussain opted for the vegetarian diet, which usually
consisted of leftover mashed potatoes and sweet beans on a tray.100
Hussain experienced other problems at McHenry as well. At Kenosha,
Hussain had at least been able to see his wife and daughter in person, even if
they were separated by a partition. At McHenry, on the other hand, he could
only see them via videoconference. Likewise, at Kenosha, Hussain had been
able to go outside every day; at McHenry there was no outdoor recreation.
In fact, there was no recreation of any kind, and the only equipment in the
“gym” was a pull-up bar. McHenry also did not give detainees an actual
toothbrush to brush their teeth. Instead, the jail provided them with a roughbristled brush attached to a ring. The brush was so hard it injured Hussain’s
gums, and so small that he once almost choked on it.
On about June 18, 2006, DHS moved Hussain from McHenry to the
Dodge County Jail in southern Wisconsin. At Dodge, Hussain was given a
technically Halal but unappetizing diet of processed, fried fish. During
Ramadan at Dodge, Hussain experienced some of the same problems that he
had endured at Kenosha. He only received small portions of cold food, often
late, and with stale bread. He complained on one occasion that he was given
bologna instead of fish and that sometimes in the morning there was no
food, or that there was only spoiled fruit.101
On or about August 28, 2007, ICE moved Hussain about six hours
south of Chicago to the TriCounty Detention Center in Ullin, Illinois. This
completed Hussain’s tour of every ICE detention center in the region. After
his attorneys complained about this relocation, ICE moved Hussain back to
Dodge almost immediately, but failed to transfer his commissary account
from TriCounty.102
The media has reported widely on the problems with detainee medical
care103 that also plagued Hussain during his detention. Although Hussain
had always been healthy, he developed gum disease while detained. Unlike
the medical problems that some detainees have faced, periodontal disease is
painful, degenerative, and expensive to treat, but not life threatening.
For well over a year, we unsuccessfully sought, through a chain of inmate request forms, e-mails, letters, and phone calls, to get Hussain treatment. At a number of points we were told that Hussain’s problems had been
100
Greg Trotter, A mission shared, a flock divided, MEDILL REPS., available at http://
news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/govt/story.aspx?id=156797.
101
E-mail from Christopher McDaniels, Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (Oct. 16, 2006, 16:19 CST) (on file with author).
102
I complained about the loss of Hussain’s commissary funds, and they were eventually
returned to him in October 2007. E-mail from Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago, to Charles Scoles, Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Sept. 27, 2007, 15:16 CST) (on file
with author); E-mail from Charles Scoles, Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (Oct. 2, 2007, 11:04 CST) (on file with author).
103
Bernstein, supra note 10.
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or would be taken care of, but it always turned out that there had been some
miscommunication. For example, after we filed a habeas petition in March
2007, the U.S. Attorney told me that Hussain had recently had a tooth pulled, which she said should take care of his dental needs.104 Hussain was
bewildered when I mentioned this to him, however, as he had not had a tooth
pulled. After I passed this information along to the U.S. Attorney, she investigated and learned that ICE had provided her with incorrect information.105
Similarly, an ICE supervisor, Charles Scoles, informed me in July 2007
that Dodge had no record that Hussain made any recent dental requests, but
when I assured him that this was untrue, he investigated further and learned
that his information had been incorrect. Scoles also provided me with a
possible explanation for Hussain’s inability to access dental treatment. The
Dodge County staff apparently informed him that the Division of Immigrant
Health Services (“DIHS”), which pays for detainee health care, does not
cover surgery for gum disease. Scoles suggested that if I disagreed with this
policy, I should contact Captain Philip Jarres, a head DIHS official in Washington, D.C.
Initially, Captain Jarres did not respond to the letter I sent him, so in
August 2007, I sent a follow-up e-mail. The next day, Captain Jarres responded that I should go through ICE channels.106 When I replied that ICE
had advised me to contact him, Jarres referred the matter to an officer within
the DIHS managed care department.107 I learned from that officer that
Dodge had never even made a request to DIHS for dental surgery. When I
relayed this information to Scoles, he replied that Dodge County would
reevaluate Hussain.108 In October 2007, Hussain saw a dentist who again
informed him that he had severe periodontal disease and recommended surgery. Scoles informed me that Dodge subsequently contacted DIHS and re-

104
E-mail from Lennie Lehman, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United
States Attorney, Eastern District of Wisconsin, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal
Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (Mar. 30, 2007, 10:33 CST) (on file with
author).
105
E-mail from Lennie Lehman, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United
States Attorney, Eastern District of Wisconsin, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal
Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (Apr. 2, 2007, 09:52 CST) (on file with
author).
106
E-mail from Captain Philip Jarres, Associate Director, Division of Immigration Health
Services, Headquarters Field Operations Branch, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal
Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (Aug. 16, 2007, 08:07 CST) (on file with
author).
107
E-mail from Captain Philip Jarres, Associate Director, Division of Immigration Health
Services, Headquarters Field Operations Branch, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal
Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (Aug. 16, 2007, 12:11 CST) (on file with
author).
108
E-mail from Charles Scoles, Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (Sept. 27, 2007, 09:15 CST) (on file with author).
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quested dental work, but to my knowledge, this request was never
approved.109
Unable to perform surgery, a dentist prescribed Hussain with a special
kind of mouthwash.110 Dodge neglected to fill the prescription, however,
and I submitted numerous complaints via e-mail. ICE reacted to my complaints with a series of contradictory or unresponsive replies. First, ICE assured me that Dodge would fill the prescription.111 Next, I was told that
Dodge refused to give Hussain the mouthwash because it contained alcohol
(apparently the staff was concerned about the Muslim Hussain tippling), but
that ICE would assure Dodge’s compliance.112 The next week, I confirmed
that the mouthwash was available; however, ICE explained that Dodge
would only allow Hussain to use the mouthwash before meals when the
nurse was accustomed to making her rounds, rather than after meals when it
would have been most useful.113 At that point, the ICE officer also informed
me that Hussain was unable to use dental floss at Dodge due to security
concerns.114
The exhausting history of Hussain’s efforts to receive care in detention
reveals the government’s recalcitrance when it is called to step outside the
paradigm of relatively cheap, short-term care.115 It also shows the communication problems that develop when multiple levels of government bureaucracy are introduced into a privatized detention system. Despite the
involvement of multiple lawyers, jail officials, and ICE and DIHS officers,
Hussain did not receive treatment for his gum disease until after he was
released from detention.

109
E-mail from Charles Scoles, Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (Oct. 11, 2007, 12:27 CST) (on file with author).
110
E-mail from Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago to Charles Scoles, Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Mar. 20, 2008, 10:06 CST) (on file with author).
111
E-mail from Charles Scoles, Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (Mar. 28, 2008, 14:10 CST) (on file with author).
112
E-mail from Charles Scoles, Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (Apr. 3, 2008, 15:15 CST) (on file with author); E-mail from
Chris McDaniels, Assistant Field Office Director, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to
Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago
(Apr. 7, 2008, 15:38 CST) (on file with author).
113
E-mail from Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago to Chris McDaniels, Assistant Field Office Director, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (Apr. 10, 2008, 15:53 CST) (on file with author).
114
E-mail from Chris McDaniels, Assistant Field Office Director, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, to Geoffrey Heeren, Senior Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of
Metropolitan Chicago (May 2, 2008, 16:43 CST) (on file with author).
115
For another example of the government’s efforts to dodge paying for an expensive
illness, see Bernstein, supra note 11 (discussing how DHS officials conferred over e-mail
about options for avoiding the cost of treatment for a dying Guinean immigrant, including
sending him back to his native Guinea or simply releasing him).

R

\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC209.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 19

Pulling Teeth
PART II: LEGAL CHALLENGES

6-AUG-10

15:10

619
TO

DETENTION

All told, Hussain spent about three years in immigration custody. He
spent these years litigating both the merits of his deportation case and the
legality of his detention. When DHS refused to release Hussain on the IJ’s
bond order, we filed a habeas petition in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
This detention challenge is noteworthy both because it established the controlling precedent in the Seventh Circuit on this issue and because it is illustrative of the difficulties inherent in this type of litigation.
A. A History of Detention Litigation
Hussain’s habeas petition was based in large part on a reading of two
Supreme Court decisions: Zadvydas v. Davis,116 and Demore v. Kim.117 In
Zadvydas the Court considered the cases of two immigrants whom the Government had been unable to deport—Kestutis Zadvydas, who was born to
Lithuanian parents in a displaced persons camp in Germany in 1948; and
Kim Ho Ma, who was born in Cambodia in 1977. The Government was
unable to deport Zadvydas because no country would acknowledge his citizenship.118 It could not deport Ma because the United States had no repatriation agreement with Cambodia at the time.119
The INA authorizes an immigrant’s release on an order of supervision if
the Government is unable to deport the immigrant within a ninety-day removal period.120 However, it also provides that the Government “may” continue to detain the alien for an unspecified period of time thereafter.121 The
Government chose to continue to detain both Zadvydas and Ma while it
allegedly pursued efforts to deport them to various countries and vigorously
defended its right to do so. It argued that the post-removal detention provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, could reasonably be interpreted to give it the power to
hold removed immigrants in detention indefinitely.122
The Court disagreed. It noted that it would create serious constitutional
problems if a statute authorized indefinite civil detention without strong procedural safeguards.123 The Court found the statute to be ambiguous and interpreted it in such a way as to avoid a due process violation.124 Under the
Court’s interpretation, § 1231 only authorized detention of removable aliens
when removal was “reasonably foreseeable.”125 The Court also adopted a
116

533 U.S. 678 (2001).
538 U.S. 510 (2003).
118
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684.
119
Id. at 684–86.
120
Id. at 683.
121
Id. at 689.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 690.
124
Id. at 699.
125
Id.
117
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presumption that post-removal order detention of less than six months would
be constitutionally permissible.126 In response to Zadvydas, the Government
promulgated regulations that limit long-term post-removal detention of immigrants to situations in which special circumstances are present and particular procedural requirements are satisfied.127
The Court considered the constitutionality of mandatory detention during removal proceedings two years later in Kim. Hyung Joon Kim was a
Korean lawful permanent resident who was convicted of burglary and “petty
theft with priors.”128 As a result, the Government alleged that he was deportable and subject to mandatory detention due to his convictions for multiple crimes involving moral turpitude.129 Kim conceded his deportability, but
sought withholding of removal and challenged the constitutionality of his
mandatory detention in federal court.130
In a fractured decision, the Court upheld the Government’s interpretation of § 1226(c). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion principally focused upon two factors: Congress’s compelling rationale in enacting
§ 1226(c) and the relatively short duration of detention during removal proceedings. Rehnquist first noted that Congress passed § 1226(c) “against a
backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of
criminal activity by aliens,”131 and then explained that the INS’s failure to
deport “criminal aliens” was due, in part, to its inability to detain immigrants during their removal proceedings.132 Although the INS had discretion
to detain immigrants during their removal case, it was often swayed by a
lack of detention space to release them. Once released, more than 20% of
immigrants absconded.133 The Court concluded that mandatory detention
was a legitimate (if not the only legitimate) way to address this problem.134
Justice Rehnquist distinguished Zadvydas on the basis that the Court
confronted indefinite detention in that case.135 By contrast, detention during

126
Id. at 699–702. In Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005), the Court extended its
holding in Zadvydas to another category of immigrants: “inadmissible” persons. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6) (2006). There is a distinction in immigration law, which is beyond the scope of
this article, between grounds for “inadmissibility,” which apply to immigrants in some circumstances, and grounds for “deportability,” which apply in others. Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (2006), with 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006). The Government had argued in Clark that there
were constitutional and policy justifications for treating inadmissible immigrants differently
than deportable immigrants, but the Court found that statutory language cannot be interpreted
one way with respect to one category and a different way with respect to another. Clark, 543
U.S. at 377–78.
127
See Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg.
56, 968–69 (Nov. 14, 2001).
128
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003).
129
Id. at 513 n.1.
130
Id. at 513–14.
131
Id. at 518.
132
Id. at 519.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 528.
135
Id. at 527–28.
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removal proceedings has a better-defined endpoint—the conclusion of the
removal case. Justice Rehnquist noted that mandatory detention “lasts
roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the alien
chooses to appeal.”136
The Kim decision rested on a tenuous majority. Only Justice Kennedy
joined in the entirety of the opinion. Some Justices joined the portion of the
opinion finding a right to judicial review but dissented as to the merits, and
other Justices took the opposite approach. Given these conflicting opinions,
it is easy to argue that Kim is a narrow decision, the precedential value of
which is limited to factually similar cases. Two of the concurrences suggest
that the Court might rule a different way in a case with different facts. Justice Kennedy noted that, in a case of “unreasonable delay,” a court should
“inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect
against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.”137 Justice Breyer made a different, but somewhat related point: Kim
had conceded his removability.138 Thus, an immigrant “armed with a strong
argument against deportability” might have a good argument that § 1226(c)
does not govern his detention.139
Unsurprisingly, Kim did not end challenges to mandatory detention.
Almost immediately after Kim, courts were confronted with cases involving
immigrants who had been held in custody for periods far in excess of the
five-month average detention time that the Supreme Court found reasonable
in Kim. For example, in Ly v. Hansen,140 a Vietnamese refugee was held in
custody for 500 days before a district court released him on a writ of habeas
corpus. The Government appealed, and in the meantime, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Demore v. Kim. The Sixth Circuit distinguished Ly’s
case from Kim based on two principal factors: the length of his detention
and the low likelihood of his ultimate deportation to Vietnam, because it was
a country with which the United States had no repatriation agreement.141
After Ly, the Ninth Circuit weighed in on prolonged detention in two
cases: Tijani v. Willis142 and Nadarajah v. Gonzales.143 The majority opinion
in Tijani was terse and did little to flesh out the Court’s rationale. Essentially, the court interpreted “the authority conferred by § 1226(c) as applying to expedited removal of criminal aliens,” and found that Tijani’s twoyear and eight-month-long process was far from expeditious.144 The court
136
Id. at 530. Kim was detained for six months, a bit longer than the average, but Justice
Rehnquist noted that he had requested a continuance. Id. at 530–31.
137
Id. at 532–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
138
Id. at 578 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139
Id.
140
351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003).
141
Id. at 270–71.
142
430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005).
143
443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).
144
Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242.
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remanded the case to the district court with instructions to grant the writ
unless the Government provided Tijani with a bond hearing before an IJ
within sixty days.145
In Nadarajah the court gave a similar, if lengthier explanation for
granting release to an immigrant who had been held in detention for five
years. The court found that the general immigration detention statutes do
not authorize prolonged detention, noting that the Government has other procedures available to it to indefinitely detain alien terrorists.146 The court also
held that it had authority under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to
order Nadarajah’s immediate release from detention without any further
hearing.147 Thus, by 2007, the only two circuits to consider the issue—the
Sixth and the Ninth—had held that in at least some cases, an immigrant
could challenge prolonged detention during removal proceedings.
B. Hussain’s Detention Challenge
It was against this promising backdrop that Hussain brought his petition
for habeas corpus. In addition to challenging his prolonged detention and
lack of appropriate procedural safeguards, he also challenged DHS’s authority under the automatic stay regulation to nullify the IJ’s bond order. We had
some reason to be optimistic here as well, as five district courts had found a
prior version of the regulation unconstitutional.148 Finally, Hussain’s personal circumstances had become increasingly dire and compelling. Without
Hussain’s income, his wife had been unable to keep up with the couple’s
mortgage payments and their home had gone into foreclosure.149 Further, in
addition to developing gum disease—which by that point had resulted in the
loss of two teeth—Hussain had lost nearly forty pounds. He now also had
another aching, carious tooth.
For the habeas hearing, we were assigned Judge William Griesbach, a
recent Bush appointee who served in Green Bay, Wisconsin. After the parties briefed the case, Judge Griesbach set it for hearing on May 4, 2007.
In the meantime, DHS aggressively pursued its bond appeal. It had
reason to be hopeful about its chances. In 2002, then-Attorney General Ash145

Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1243.
Id. at 1079.
147
Id. at 1083–84.
148
See, e.g., Zabadi v. Chertoff, No. 05-1796, 2005 WL 1514122 (N.D. Cal. June 17,
2005); Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp.
2d 662 (D.N.J. 2003); Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F. Supp. 2d 842 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Bezmen v.
Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Conn. 2003).
149
See Washington Mutual Bank v. Hussain, 2006-CH-21229 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Ill.
Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org/?section=CASEINFOPage
&CASEINFOPage=2400 (enter Case Year “2006,” then enter Division Code “CH,” then
enter Case Number “21229,” then select “Search Now”). Another attorney at the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago, David Yen, filed a bankruptcy that allowed Hussain to stave off foreclosure. See In re Patricia Eng Hussain, No. 07-10011 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
June 4, 2007).
146
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croft fired seven of the eighteen members of the BIA—all Clinton administration appointees.150 Among those fired were BIA members who had
written decisions favorable to immigrants, who had once represented immigrants, and who had taught immigration law in law schools.151 Those remaining came primarily from the ranks of the former INS, other law
enforcement agencies, and the staffs of Republican members of Congress.152
Regarding the BIA appeal, DHS initially sought to replace the “automatic stay” that Hussain had challenged in his habeas petition with an
“emergency” discretionary stay, which would be less vulnerable to constitutional attack.153 We received a copy of DHS’s motion on April 2, 2007, and
received a three-sentence-long faxed order from the BIA, granting the DHS
request one hour later.
DHS’s bond appeal argument received a boost in March 2007, when the
BIA issued its decision in Matter of Kotliar.154 In Kotliar, the BIA considered whether an immigrant who had been convicted of multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, but not charged as deportable on that ground, was
subject to mandatory detention. The BIA concluded that an IJ can find an
immigrant ineligible for bond if DHS could have charged him with a ground
of removal that would subject him to mandatory detention, even if DHS did
not actually do so.155 It was unclear whether this decision applied to Hussain’s case, however, since in Kotliar there was clear evidence of criminal
convictions that subjected the immigrant to mandatory detention.156 In Hussain’s case, the BIA had only DHS’s informal allegations that Hussain provided material support to a terrorist organization. Nonetheless, the Kotliar
decision provided an additional reason to be skeptical of the outcome in the
bond appeal.
On May 1, 2007—just over one year after Hussain’s last immigration
hearing and exactly three days before the hearing before Judge Griesbach on
Hussain’s habeas petition—IJ Katsivalis issued a decision in Hussain’s immigration case. IJ Katsivalis found that Hussain was subject to removal for
having entered the United States using a fraudulent parole document.157 He
found that MQM met the INA’s broad definition of “terrorist organization”
and that Hussain had provided material support to MQM which made him
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal.158 However, the IJ also
found that Hussain would likely be tortured if returned to Pakistan and there-

150
See DAVID NGARURI KENNEY AND PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ASYLUM DENIED: A REFUGEE’S
STRUGGLE FOR SAFETY IN AMERICA 169 (2008).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(1) (2009).
154
24 I. & N. Dec. 124 (BIA 2007).
155
Id. at 127.
156
Id. at 124–25.
157
Hussain Brief, supra note 26, at 21.
158
Id. at 22.
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fore granted his application for deferral of removal under the Convention
Against Torture.159 Both sides appealed the decision.
On May 4, 2007, I drove to Green Bay, Wisconsin for the habeas hearing before Judge Griesbach. While en route, the U.S. Attorney faxed a copy
of the Board’s decision on Hussain’s bond appeal that was issued that morning. The decision relied on Kotliar to find that Hussain could be subject to
mandatory detention based on terrorism without ever having been charged
with a ground of removal related to terrorism.160 The Board remanded the
case to give Hussain a chance to request a Joseph hearing, but the remand
was a mere formality, since IJ Katsivalis had found the week before that
Hussain was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because of
his alleged material support for a terrorist organization. IJ Katsivalis’s earlier ruling on the terrorism issue made Hussain ineligible for bond.
During the habeas hearing, Judge Griesbach appeared concerned that
the two recent decisions made our claims moot. I argued that he continued
to have jurisdiction because both sides were appealing IJ Katsivalis’s merits
decision and because there was no definite time period for resolution of the
appeal. Moreover, I noted that Hussain had been granted relief under CAT,
making his ultimate removal to Pakistan highly unlikely.
On May 22, 2007, Judge Griesbach issued a decision denying Hussain’s
petition.161 He dismissed Hussain’s challenge to his prolonged detention,
finding that his ultimate removal to Pakistan was more likely than the removals in Nadarajah and Ly.162 He also noted that although Hussain had
been granted relief under CAT, DHS had appealed and suggested that DHS
might have a strong case on appeal.163 Moreover, he noted that even if DHS
lost, it could still attempt to deport Hussain to another country or seek “diplomatic assurances” from Pakistan that it would not torture him.164 Finally,
Judge Griesbach suggested that national security concerns weighed against
granting relief.165 Hussain appealed Judge Griesbach’s decision to the Seventh Circuit.
On October 15, 2007, the BIA issued a decision on Hussain’s case. It
affirmed both the IJ’s removal order and his grant of CAT.166 DHS filed a
motion to reconsider this decision (which the BIA later denied), and I filed a
petition for review of Hussain’s removal order to the Seventh Circuit. Hussain chose to appeal the BIA decision because he was concerned that CAT
provided him little security; as Judge Griesbach had noted, DHS could continue to try to deport him to countries other than Pakistan or even try to
159

Id.
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals on Bond Appeal, In re Mohammad
Hussain, A070-921-157 (BIA May 4, 2007) (on file with author).
161
Hussain v. Gonzales, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1036 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
162
Id. at 1035.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Hussain Brief, supra note 26, at 22–23.
160
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deport him to Pakistan if Pakistan gave “diplomatic assurances” that it
would not torture him. For the same reasons, Hussain filed a motion with
the Seventh Circuit to stay his removal, which the Court granted.167
On November 29, 2007, Iris Bennett of Jenner & Block argued Hussain’s habeas appeal in the Seventh Circuit. The panel of judges included
Judges Richard Posner, Terence Evans, and Richard Cudahy. Judge Posner
dominated the argument with a series of questions about why the case was
not moot given the fact that the administrative removal case was essentially
over. Ms. Bennett argued that there was no telling when Hussain’s detention
would end, since the Seventh Circuit could take a long time to issue a decision on his appeal and because such decision could result in a remand to the
Agency.
On December 18, 2007, the court issued a decision, written by Judge
Posner.168 Judge Posner essentially found that Hussain’s case was moot.169
He noted that in a case of “inordinate delay,” a court might be justified in
granting a habeas petition;170 but he determined that Hussain filed his case
too late: “By delay in seeking habeas corpus he allowed his case for release
pending the completion of the proceeding to become moot.”171 He pointed
out that the court had expedited review of his removal order, and that by the
time the court finished reading the “167 pages of contentious briefing” in
the habeas filings, it would have resolved the larger question of whether he
was deportable.172
On February 13, 2008, I argued Hussain’s appeal of his removal order
before the same Seventh Circuit panel that had heard his habeas petition.
The appeal involved complicated questions about how to interpret “material
support” to a “terrorist organization.” Judge Posner again dominated the
argument, this time proposing a series of hypothetical questions about
Hamas that I tried to argue were not relevant to MQM, a very different type
of organization. The court issued a decision less than a month later. Again
the author, Judge Posner affirmed the BIA’s order.173
After the Seventh Circuit appeal was over, the authority for Hussain’s
detention shifted to the post-removal order statute.174 Under that statute,
DHS had ninety days to effect Hussain’s removal. If it was unable to deport
him within that timeframe, it was required to consider him for release. It

167
Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2007) (decision concerning the
habeas appeal).
168
Id. at 739.
169
Id. at 742.
170
Id. at 743.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008) (decision concerning the merits
appeal).
174
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (providing that in a case where a court of
appeals has granted a stay of removal, the “removal period” begins on the date of the court’s
final order).

\\server05\productn\H\HLC\45-2\HLC209.txt

626

unknown

Seq: 26

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

6-AUG-10

15:10

[Vol. 45

seemed that DHS would not meet this deadline, as it was extraordinarily
unlikely to succeed in convincing another country to accept Hussain. In
fact, there are very few cases where DHS has ever succeeded in deporting an
immigrant to a country where she does not have citizenship.175 Nonetheless,
it appears to be DHS’s policy to always hold immigrants—even those
granted withholding of removal or relief under CAT—for ninety days after
issuance of a removal order while it makes pro forma efforts to remove the
person elsewhere.176
In Hussain’s case, DHS had already begun making these efforts. On
November 6, 2007, DHS brought Hussain to downtown Chicago, where an
officer questioned him about his ties to various countries to which DHS
might try deporting him, such as India. Hussain advised the officer that he
had family in India and at the officer’s request, he completed an Indian passport application. We all understood that the odds India would grant this
passport application were small because Hussain had no basis for claiming
Indian citizenship.
Since the Seventh Circuit granted Hussain’s motion for a stay of removal, DHS was not required to consider him for release until ninety days
after the court’s final decision.177 Oddly, however, DHS issued a decision on
a “post order custody review” on February 28, 2008.178 DHS denied Hussain release, claiming that he had failed to sufficiently cooperate with DHS’s
effort to obtain an Indian passport for him. It is unclear why DHS believed
that Hussain failed to cooperate, since he had provided them with requested
information and completed an application for the passport. In any event,
DHS later released Hussain, without comment, exactly ninety days after the
Seventh Circuit decision.179
PART III: DETENTION REFORM
Around the time of Hussain’s release, the New York Times and Washington Post began to publish a series of articles that exposed shameful conditions in immigration detention.180 Since then, reform efforts have gathered
momentum. DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano appointed a special advisor on
detention, Dr. Dora Schriro, who produced a report that sets out the enormous fiscal burden of immigration detention and suggests various reforms.181
Dr. Schriro’s report includes the following recommendations:
175
See, e.g., Tim Golden, Chinese Leave Guantánamo for Albanian Limbo, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2007, at A1.
176
See, e.g., Cesar v. Achim, 542 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
177
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
178
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Decision to Continue Detention, In re Mohammad Azam Hussain, A070-921-157 (Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with author).
179
Hussain was released on June 4, 2008 on electronic monitoring. See Hussain Order of
Supervision (on file with author).
180
See supra notes 93–94.
181
SCHRIRO, supra note 1.
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• Reduce the overall number of detention facilities, centralize procurement of new facilities, and improve local and regional oversight;182
• Detain immigrants in the least restrictive settings consistent with their
assessed risk level and monitor disciplinary practices;183
• Restrict the transfer of represented detainees to faraway detention
centers;184
• Increase the use of community-based supervision strategies (“Alternatives to Detention”) for those who are not subject to mandatory
custody;185
• Establish an “integrated health care system” for medical, mental, and
dental health;186
• Improve law library access, indoor and outdoor recreation, visitation,
and religious activities;187
• Improve treatment of “special populations” such as families with minor children, females, unaccompanied minors, the ill and infirm, and
asylum seekers;188
• Increase accountability by developing civil detention standards that
are consistent with the goals of civil detention, appointing on-site staff
to oversee detention facilities, and discontinuing the use of problematic detention facilities.189
Although these reforms seem salutary, they are sometimes lacking in
specifics. For instance, Dr. Schriro spends less than two pages addressing
the complicated question of what an “integrated health care system” for
immigration detainees should look like.190 She correctly identifies certain
administrative problems with the current system, such as the lack of a central
medical record-keeping system,191 but does not consider whether DIHS’s
managed care standards are adequate. The current standards are arguably
appropriate for the vast majority of detainees who are held for relatively
short periods of time. But as Hussain’s case shows, they are completely
inadequate for persons who spend years in detention.
Dr. Schriro stresses that the vast majority of immigration detainees are
released quickly: 25% within a day and 71% in less than a month.192 A
detention system that is designed to meet the needs of this population
should, presumably, look very different than one designed to hold persons
for years. It may be satisfactory to not offer outdoor recreation, comprehen182

Id.
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
183

at 18–19.
at 21, 23.
at 24.
at 20–21.
at 5, 26.
at 24–25.
at 27–28.
18–19, 28–29.
at 25–26.
at 6.
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sive dental, medical, and mental health care, or specialized diets to shortterm detainees, but it is inhumane to withhold these allowances for months
and years. Until DHS confronts this tension, it will continue to operate a
system that is both inefficient and unfair.
One way to address this problem is to pursue reforms that will make it
less likely that immigrants will be locked up for lengthy periods of time.
The United States could both improve its human rights record and save
money by releasing persons who are currently subject to mandatory detention who pose only a limited flight and security risk. Dr. Schriro openly
acknowledges that every year about 2100 immigrants are held in detention
for a year or more.193 At an average cost of between $95 and $141 per
detainee per day, the annual cost of detaining these individuals ranges between $73–108 million.194
This significant sum does not effectively serve Congress’s original goal
in enacting mandatory detention: finding a way to mandate custody for
those categories of persons who often absconded on release by IJs and who
were most likely to be deported.195 In 1996, Congress wanted persons without bases for remaining in the United States to be detained and quickly deported. Congress likely reasoned that it could improve efficiency by
rendering immigrants convicted of “aggravated felonies” and immigrants
“described in” the terrorism provisions of the INA ineligible for discretionary relief from removal. Over the past eight years, however, 5829 persons
who were held in detention for six months or more have won their removal
case by having the charges against them terminated or by being granted a
waiver of deportation.196
There are a number of reasons why so many persons in mandatory detention have won their cases. First, in addition to aggravated felons and
terrorists, the statute mandates detention of several categories of immigrants
who are eligible for discretionary relief from removal.197 Second, the categories of detention and removal are so amorphous and elastic that immigrants charged with having been convicted of an aggravated felony or a
crime involving moral turpitude may convince a court that they were improperly charged. The question of whether a crime has been properly characterized for immigration purposes involves an arcane and intensely
legalistic analysis of interlocking immigration and criminal statutes, the interpretation of which continues to evolve.198 There is a history of protracted
litigation around this “categorical approach”—the Supreme Court has re193

Id.
Compare HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 53, at 8 ($95 per day cost of detention),
with KERWIN & LIN, supra note 6, at 4 ($141 per day).
195
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003).
196
ACLU FOIA Data, supra note 9.
197
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2006).
198
See Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2009) (explaining the “categorical
approach” to determining whether a conviction constitutes an aggravated felony for immigration purposes).
194
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cently decided four contentious cases addressing this issue, and this year it
will decide yet another.199
There are also those immigrants like Hussain who are found to be properly deportable and ineligible for all discretionary relief from removal, but
still win CAT relief or withholding of removal. These immigrants, who fear
death, imprisonment, or torture in their native countries, have a strong incentive to win their removal case. Yet, DHS detained Hussain for three years,
including eleven months after he was granted CAT relief and ninety days
after all his appeals were over.200 Even if DHS believed that Hussain was a
flight risk during the earlier portion of his case, it is difficult to justify his
continued detention after he won at the immigration court level. At that
point, the odds that Hussain would win his CAT case were very good, meaning that he would have been foolish to abscond. Hussain’s unnecessary detention provides a good example of why the current system does not serve its
original purpose.
Hussain’s case also reveals how much power DHS has to control the
detention and removal process, and how difficult it is for an immigrant to
challenge DHS decisions. Initially, DHS denied Hussain bond but did not
contend that he was subject to mandatory detention. It relied on Hussain’s
recent conviction to convince IJ Katsivalis that Hussain should be discretionarily detained without bond. But when this conviction was vacated,
DHS shifted tactics, declaring that he was subject to mandatory detention as
a terrorist. And when the IJ disagreed with this decision, DHS trumped the
IJ with an automatic stay of his decision while it appealed.
It was only at this point, when the deck seemed fully stacked against
Hussain, that he took the extraordinary step of filing a lawsuit in federal
court. Federal litigation is time-consuming and complicated. There are few
immigrants who will ever have the resources to litigate a habeas petition,
and Hussain ultimately lost his.201 Judge Posner’s decision on Hussain’s
habeas appeal may have opened the door for others to pursue habeas in removal cases, but it did not make it easy to do so. On the one hand, Judge
Posner’s decision acknowledged that an individual who has been subjected to
199
See id.; Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549
U.S. 47 (2006); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 570 F.3d
263 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 78 U.S.L.W. 3058 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2009) (No. 09-60).
200
The fact that DHS released Hussain on the ninetieth day after the Seventh Circuit
decision reveals an attitude towards detention, on DHS’s part, that is excessively bureaucratic
and formalistic. It should have been clear that DHS would not succeed in removing Hussain to
India or any other country, but it still exercised its authority to detain him for the maximum
time permissible under the regulations before the post-order custody review process kicked in.
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2009). This last 90-day detention of Hussain, the cost of which likely
exceeded $9000, was for all practical intents and purposes, pro forma.
201
Four organizations represented Hussain over the course of his habeas: the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago; the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic at the University of
Chicago; the ACLU; and Jenner & Block. Among the attorneys on the case were former Chief
Judge of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and President Clinton’s former Chief Counsel,
Abner Mikva.
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unreasonably delayed proceedings can make out a claim for habeas relief; on
the other, he found that Hussain filed too late since the BIA had issued its
decision by the time of the Seventh Circuit oral argument. Thus, there
seems to be a small window in a removal case where an immigrant’s detention is neither too long nor too short. Moreover, the sudden haste the government displayed in deciding Hussain’s case after he filed his lawsuit
suggests that it has at its disposal the means to moot out any suit.
The Ninth Circuit has taken a different approach to challenges to
mandatory detention than the Seventh Circuit. Based on its understanding of
the interplay of the pre- and post-removal order detention statutes, the Ninth
Circuit has held that an immigrant with a pending petition for review and
stay of removal can, in most cases, ask an IJ for bond.202 In contrast, it might
be inferred from Judge Posner’s decision that the best an immigrant can do in
this situation is to file a motion in the circuit court to expedite review of her
removal order.203 This means that immigrants like Hussain are treated differently depending on whether they are in the Ninth or Seventh Circuit.
This variance in the way detainees are treated piles unfairness onto a
legal structure that is already convoluted and draconian. Immigrants can be
subject to mandatory detention based on DHS discretion without any requirement that it give formal notice of its decision and without limitation on
it changing its mind.204 Detainees either have no recourse to challenge
DHS’s decision or face an impossibly high threshold to do so: they must
prove that DHS is “substantially unlikely” to prevail, a standard that compounds what is already an overly complex inquiry in a removal case.205 If, as
Hussain did, the immigrant actually prevails in convincing an IJ that DHS
has overstepped, DHS can automatically stay the IJ’s bond order by filing a
notice of its intention to appeal. Should the immigrant wish to challenge her
detention in federal court, she will face a series of complicated jurisdictional

202
Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Ninth Circuit’s rationale is somewhat involved. In general, after the Board has affirmed a
removal order so that it is administratively final, the authority for detention is pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1231 (2006). However, in Casas-Castrillon, the Ninth Circuit recognized, as have
the majority of circuits to have considered this issue, that where a court has entered a stay of
removal, the authority for detention is pursuant to § 1226. The court then considered whether
detention during the course of a federal appeal should be considered to be pursuant to
§ 1226(c) or 1226(a). The court held that § 1226(c) can only apply during removal proceedings, which are complete as of the date that a removal order is administratively final. Thus, the
Court found that the Government’s detention authority for an immigrant with a pending circuit
court appeal and stay of removal is under the discretionary detention provision, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), meaning that an immigrant in that situation can seek bond from an immigration
court.
203
Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 2007).
204
See In re Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 127 (BIA 2007) (immigrant can be subject to
mandatory detention without having been charged with a ground of mandatory detention).
205
See Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 806 (BIA 1999).
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hurdles and will ultimately have her case adjudicated based on precedent
that differs substantially from one circuit to another.206
A pro se litigant has no hope of ever understanding this bizarre framework, and in fact, few lawyers do. Furthermore, intensely legalistic questions about what constitutes an aggravated felony or a crime involving moral
turpitude have little to do with whether an immigrant is a flight or security
risk. Under the “categorical approach,” an immigrant convicted of a shoplifting or drug possession charge in the distant past may be subject to
mandatory detention. This same immigrant, who may have a home, a family, and a stable job, may also be eligible for “cancellation of removal,”
which would allow her to stay in the United States.207 Conversely, an immigrant who recently entered the United States without inspection and who has
no criminal conviction (or one with no immigration consequences) will not
be subject to mandatory detention, but may have none of the equities that
make the former immigrant a good candidate for release.
Congress expanded mandatory detention in the 1990s because it wanted
to detain those immigrants who had no possibility of staying in the United
States and who were therefore likely to abscond.208 As we have seen,
mandatory detention is a radically imprecise solution to this problem. Moreover, the Government has since developed better answers. The Homeland
Security Act replaced the former INS with a new bureaucracy structured to
prioritize immigration enforcement. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—the enforcement division within DHS—administers the National Fugitive Operations Program, which, in 2003, its first year of operation,
arrested 1900 fugitives. By 2006 it had increased its number of arrests to
15,462; in 2008 it arrested more than twice that amount—34,155 absconders.209 In addition to its fugitive operations, ICE has also developed several
“alternative to detention” programs,210 which rely on global positioning ankle bracelets, telephonic monitoring, and active case specialists to assure that
non-detained immigrants in proceedings do not abscond.
These new tactics suggest that the time may be right to try a more
carefully tailored detention policy. There is a broad spectrum of ways in
which to accomplish this, ranging from legislative amendments to new legal
interpretations. The best way to simplify and rationalize the detention provisions would be to simply eliminate the current § 1226(c) and to revise other
regulations to explicitly confer jurisdiction on IJs to make custody decisions

206

For some of the jurisdictional bars to federal litigation, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)

(2006).
207

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006) (cancellation of removal).
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003).
209
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/reports/ice_annual_report/pdf/ice08ar_final.pdf.
210
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FACT SHEET—ALTERNATIVES TO
DETENTION FOR ICE DETAINEES (2009), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/alternativesto
detention.htm.
208
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at all phases of removal proceedings.211 At present, IJs’ bond jurisdiction is
limited not only by § 1226(c), but also by regulations that bar judges from
reviewing many categories of cases, such as DHS’s decisions to parole or not
parole arriving aliens or to detain immigrants after removal proceedings conclude.212 Granting the discretion to make these decisions to a single, impartial decision maker best serves the goal of detaining immigrants who pose a
flight or security risk.
Alternatively, some of the problems of mandatory detention could be
addressed if DHS simply adopted a more reasonable interpretation of the
statute. For example, DHS could interpret § 1226(c) to only apply for six
months, the duration of time reasonably necessary to conclude a removal
proceeding. There is precedent for this interpretation, since a number of
courts have adopted similar reasoning.213 Similarly, DHS could interpret
§ 1226(c) to not apply to immigrants who have a colorable defense to the
charges of removal.214 Section 1226(c) requires the detention of immigrants
who are “deportable” on various grounds, but does not define the term “deportable.”215 Thus, DHS could interpret the term to not include immigrants
with good defenses to their removal.
DHS could also use electronic monitoring for persons subject to
mandatory detention. Currently, DHS considers itself without legal authority to use electronic monitoring for persons who must be held in custody
under the statute because it does not consider monitoring to be “custody.”216
The statute does not define this term, however, and there is precedent to
consider supervision to be custody. For example, in order to have jurisdiction over a habeas petition, a court must find that the petitioner is “in custody.” Courts have held that conditions of parole that limit the parolee’s
choices and freedom of movement satisfy this requirement.217
DHS could go a long way towards improving immigration detention by
expanding the use of electronic monitoring, and limiting mandatory custody
to persons who lack a good defense to their removal and to persons who are
211
See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform for America’s Security and Prosperity
Act of 2009, H.R. 4321, 111th Cong., § 159(j)(2) (2009) (providing for review of all detention
by an IJ).
212
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i) (2009) (barring IJs from reviewing DHS’s custody determinations with respect to arriving aliens); 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a) (2009) (granting exclusive
authority to DHS to consider the release of immigrants detained after the issuance of an order
of removal).
213
See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 947–48 (9th Cir.
2008); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 269–70 (6th Cir. 2003).
214
See Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1019, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that it is an
open question whether § 1226(c) should be read to apply to an individual who has raised a
colorable challenge to his deportability).
215
See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 578 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that
§ 1226(c) “literally say[s] nothing about an individual who, armed with a strong argument
against deportability, might, or might not, fall within [its] terms”).
216
Unofficial Minutes from the Chicago American Immigration Lawyers Association
(“AILA”) Chapter ICE Liaison Meeting (Nov. 10, 2009) (on file with author).
217
See Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2003).
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in custody for less than six months. These reforms could take effect immediately. Arguably, DHS would not even need to initiate rulemaking; it could
just issue a memo outlining its new interpretations. This is not to say that
policy makers should shirk a legislative fix. The detention provisions are as
confusing as the rest of the immigration statute, and detention reform should
be a part of any comprehensive immigration reform that Congress
undertakes.
CONCLUSION
Mohammad Hussain came to this country seeking refuge. For almost a
decade he found it, until he was caught up by post-September 11th prosecutors’ new attitudes about terrorism and newfound suspicion of Muslims. Eager to show progress in an intractable war on terror, prosecutors touted their
case against Hussain, even though the “terrorist organization” in his case
was a political party with no known anti-American agenda. Arguably, Hussain’s case fits within a lineage of cases from Korematsu to Guantánamo,
where the rights of non-citizens have fallen sacrifice to a national preoccupation with security.218 During good times, the United States welcomes immigrants like Hussain; during bad times, it detains them. The story of how
Hussain became deportable for “terrorism” is both fascinating and troubling, despite the fact that it is mostly beyond the scope of an article about
immigration detention.219
Mandatory detention is not a product of 9/11; it was enacted during the
1990s. Believing itself confronted with a crisis of fugitive criminal aliens
and an ineffectual immigration bureaucracy, Congress stripped the agency of
its power to grant bond for broad categories of immigrants that it deemed to
be dangerous or likely to be deported.220 But as we have seen, the categories
of mandatory detention are imprecise and malleable. It is hard to conceive
of this system as anything other than a crude and partial measure, which is
too unfair, inefficient, and expensive to be sustainable.
This legal framework has been combined with a detention system
crafted for short-term detainees, which dispenses stopgap solutions to its
long-term detainees. While Hussain was detained, he lived under conditions
designed for brief occupancy. He could not easily visit with his family, go
outside, exercise, or practice his religion. When he developed a serious dental problem, detention centers pulled one tooth after another, but refused to
fix the underlying problem.

218
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (concerning the constitutionality
of Japanese-American internment during World War II).
219
For a discussion of the post-September 11th use of immigration law as a tool of national security and the expansion of legal understandings of “terrorism,” see DAVID COLE,
ENEMY ALIENS 22–35, 57–64 (2003).
220
Demore, 538 U.S. at 518–19.
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In this environment of half-measures, litigation is just another makeshift. Even with a team of lawyers, Hussain still could not win his habeas
petition. Immigrants in other circuits may fare better, but it is unlikely that
any case in the near future will achieve systemic reform. Rather, a complete
solution to the problems of mandatory detention will likely have to come
from legislation. Unfortunately, the ideal solution may be as politically unpopular as pulling teeth: the deletion of the mandatory detention provision.
In the meantime, however, DHS could considerably improve matters
through regulatory reform or the adoption of more sensible interpretations of
the current mandatory detention statute. DHS could, for example, interpret
§ 1226(c) to only apply for a six-month period or to only apply to persons
without a colorable challenge to their removal. Likewise, DHS could interpret § 1226(c)’s requirement that it hold certain persons in “custody” to include custody through electronic monitoring. These changes would allow
DHS to save money that it needs to track down fugitives and improve the
detention system for those who must be detained.
It is important for any sovereign nation, even one that was founded and
has been sustained by immigrants, to effectively enforce its immigration policies. Sometimes this will require detaining immigration violators who pose
a risk to national security or who are likely to abscond if they are not detained. However, the current rules for immigration detention do not fairly or
efficiently accomplish this goal; they result in expensive and unfair longterm detention of thousands of immigrants who could safely be released.
This nation of immigrants can do better.

